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Abstract 
Little research has been conducted into the way delegations prepare for, and then participate 
in, plenary meetings under multi-lateral environmental agreements - a key administrative 
stage in the on-going development of international environmental regimes and law. Using the 
1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance being used as the main example, 
this paper explores the external rules that shape the „internal modalities‟ of states and their 
delegations as they undertake these stages. Other insights into delegate preparation and 
participation are sought from published accounts and internet based resources. 
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Since Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein first sought to widen academic enquiry into the 
institutional arrangements established to serve environmental treaties,
1
 numerous authors 
have looked to engage with the topic and their article.
2
 Indeed, the subsequent literature could 
lead to the view that the administrative dimensions of multilateral environmental agreements 
(„MEAs‟) have finally received the level of analysis that Churchill and Ulfstein thought 
wanting 12 years ago.
3
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 Nevertheless, the academic attention that has been devoted to institutional 
arrangements has predominantly focused upon the legal significance of outputs from 
conferences of the parties (or their counterparts). This is not a criticism, not least because the 
question of legal significance has become a pressing issue given the growing corpus of 
decisions, recommendations, and resolutions of conferences of the parties (hereafter, 
„COPs‟). That accumulation has accelerated through the adoption of more environmental 
treaties since the 1970‟s and the now standard practice of establishing plenary bodies under 
these agreements. It is unwise to immediately dismiss this sizeable output, especially since 
COP decisions can be of great significance.  
But there is more that deserves to be investigated and diverse paths that can be pursued, 
for example on such matters as compliance, global administrative law and systems theory. 
The current paper, using the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
4
 as 
the main example, looks to introduce a new path; one which if ultimately followed in full will 
serve to add significant depth to our understanding and critique of administrative processes 
and the sources of international law. Simply stated, there is a need to investigate how 
delegates prepare for COPs and how they then participate.  
 
 
2. Methods and Contributions 
 
2.1. Focus on ‘Internal Modalities’ 
 
Whilst the research question divides into two parts (preparation and participation), the main 
endeavour will be to identify and analyse the sets of rules, customs and ethics that operate 
within delegations when they undertake these stages. A short-hand term will be used to 
encapsulate these sets: „internal modalities‟. Internal modalities exist within many groups in 
society beyond delegations to COPs. Take, for example, professional team sports. All of the 
teams will operate an internal modality tailored towards an individual goal. Such goals can 
vary, for example winning a league or cup, or financial survival. Setting this modality will be 
the responsibility of the team‟s director or owner. For example, they will establish ways of 
generating income to fund the team, and recruit managers with responsibility for developing 
tactics for games. At the same time, other rival teams are doing likewise. Significantly, it is 
during the game that these modalities become entwined and affect each other, ultimately 
producing a result.  
Two key features of internal modalities are, first, that they can be adjusted, and 
second, there will often be external rules that shape these practices. For example, the 
governing body of the sport in question must protect the interest of the sport, which includes 
ensuring that there are participants, that there are rules to the competition and that there is 
public interest.  
The internal modalities of delegations to COPs behave in a similar way and setting. 
Whilst competitiveness is not necessarily present in every plenary meeting under an MEA, 
delegations will have their own internal modalities governing how they prepare for meetings 
and how they will participate in the work of a session. These will be set according to their 
objectives and these modalities will ultimately become entwined with those of other states 
during COPs. What is more, autonomy to determine the nature of that internal modality is 
also constrained to the extent that international law, the treaty establishing the COP and rules 
of procedure must be respected and followed. As matters stand, no-one has identified, 
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 described and assessed those internal modalities, or reviewed the external forces that can 
shape them.  
 
The intention of this paper is to see what can be revealed about the internal modalities 
surrounding preparation and participation based upon existing scholarship and records. As 
will be seen, modest progress can be made on the external influences but information on the 
internal modalities themselves is harder to locate. Furthermore, and as a reflection of the 
paucity of work that has been undertaken in this area, the available sources of information 
still leave many fascinating questions unanswered. Ultimately a different methodology based 
upon interviews may yield new insights and take a step towards answering these questions.  
 
2.2. Placing the Research 
 
Many who research public international law concentrate upon the output of multi-state 
relations and particularly the formal sources of international law, i.e. treaties, non-binding 
initiatives, resolutions of COPs, amendments to appendices, and judicial and arbitral 
pronouncements. Such sources for the purposes of this paper are regarded as the „foreground‟ 
of international environmental law. Theories and rules concerning the normative force of this 
foreground,
5
 and the best way to draw states towards compliance,
6
 have been developed. 
However, there is a lack of realism in focusing only upon these acts since this misses much of 
importance that came before and shaped those outputs.
7
 Some international lawyers may feel 
that activities on these planes that lie behind the foreground should be the preserve of politics 
and international relations scholars. Certainly those focused solely upon the task of 
interpretation of an international legal text will only be interested in antecedent events to the 
extent that such activity is recognised as a source for treaty interpretation.
8
 Nevertheless, and 
additional to the pursuit of realism, there are good reasons for legal scholars to analyse 
antecedent processes like decision making at COPs. For example, by introducing a shift in the 
focus of enquiry to activity on these planes – the „background‟ (national policies and 
practices, like preparation) and „middle-ground‟ (the interactions of states through, for 
example, participation at COPs) – a richer appreciation of the way MEAs mature and evolve 
will be provided. Furthermore, new themes (e.g. internal modalities) found on these planes 
should be opened up for challenge or sharing as best practice.  
Such investigation will also serve to remind others that, as Daniel Bodansky says, „in 
the end, decisions are made not by abstract entities, but by individuals who are motivated by 
a multitude of factors: promoting what they believe to be in the national interest, promoting 
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 their own interests, doing what they believe is right, doing what they believe the law requires, 
and so forth.‟9 
Finally, and without the need to favour any one school of thought, the research might 
inform theories surrounding the likelihood of states and private individuals following a 
particular decision or direction. For example, under Brunnée and Toope‟s interactional 
theory, law‟s value lies in the sense of obligation it generates.10 That obligation is generated 
where states and actors perceive law making to be legitimate.
11
 In their theory, legitimacy 
flows from three factors:
12
 (i) shared understandings of the role of law and particular norms; 
(ii) a norm substantially adhering to criteria of legality, such as the fact a norm must not 
demand the impossible;
13
 and (iii) reinforcement of the norm through a continuing practice of 
legality.  
COPs play a key role in nurturing obligation, as the forum for building a community 
of practice and sustaining shared understanding and interaction within it.
14
 As will be seen, 
COPs may well also be the body responsible for producing or developing norms that will 
need to adhere to the criteria of legality. Given this, it is possible to see how research on 
preparation and participation might inform this theory of obligation. For example, the 
community of practice operating under an MEA thrives through nourishment from others 
existing at the national and international levels.
15
 This means preparation that facilitates 
communication and interaction with these communities ought to be valuable. Preparation 
might also establish that which is practicable and consistent with national and international 
commitments already undertaken by a state, thereby delivering on elements of legality. 
Finally, the findings on participation might be such that they too indicate a propensity to 
deliver on the criteria of legality, and generate genuine and shared understandings. 
As an alternative example, and looking to assimilate a number of schools, Bodansky 
regards states and individuals as being responsive to substance, legitimacy and/or pressure 
from a third party
 16
 and it is easy to see how this research could relate to two of his ideas. 
Looking at the first of these, the suggestion is that if the substance of a direction is 
convincing on its merits this can lead to particular behaviour. This may be because it is 
interpreted as being in the interest of a state or the individual whose acts count as those of the 
state.
17
 Nevertheless, a decision may also be rationally persuasive for other reasons, for 
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 example when it is felt to be justified by science, or because of fairness.
18
 The degree of 
substantive persuasiveness is therefore partly dependent upon the formulation of a decision; 
that is the ability of the state to identify its interests and then (if needed) influence the content 
of a decision in the run-up to its adoption. 
Of course, a decision might be followed, regardless of a state‟s stance on its 
persuasiveness, because of pressure from a third party against a state.
19
 This relies upon an 
external power or force. As such, the relevant force comes after the production of a decision, 
and might include threats of trade sanctions,
20
 or measures imposed by COPs as part of 
compliance procedures. It is anticipated that looking at preparation and participation will not 
offer many insights into the exercise of such power. 
Finally, even in the absence of power, and even if an individual is not persuaded by the 
substance of a decision, they may still follow it because of the perceived legitimacy of the 
decision-maker or decision-making process.
21
 Therefore, legitimacy in this sense is also 
derived from events that are often antecedent to the passing of a decision. For example, a law 
may seem unreasonable, but is followed because it is perceived as having been properly 
enacted; or the grounds for a recommendation hard for an individual to appreciate, but they 
remain inclined to accept the word of the decision-maker so they act in accordance with the 
direction. Legitimacy and its effects in this sense are dependent upon the perception of the 
target audience. Thus research in this field should seek to reveal the internal modalities of 
preparation and participation, enabling perceptions as to legitimacy of the COP process to be 
checked and better informed.  
 
 
3. COPs – Connecting the Foreground and Background 
 
Broadly conceived COPs can be seen as the conduit through which the national position of 
contracting parties can be represented and advanced on the way towards adopting decisions, 
recommendations or resolutions.  Thus they are the middle-ground link between part of the 
background and foreground of international environmental law. Some detail on this role is 
desirable in order to clarify the demands upon delegates when preparing for and attending 
COPs, and its impact upon the eventual research methodology.  
 
3.1. The Development of COPs 
 
Many MEAs have chosen to establish dedicated institutional arrangements instead of relying 
upon the services of international organisations.
22
 These administrative structures comprise a 
number of component parts, usually incorporating a Secretariat, a COP, an interim committee 
of some contracting states to assist the Secretariat between plenary sessions, a scientific 
advisory group and ad hoc working groups instructed to work on particular topics. The COP 
is therefore one part of this set-up, although its centrality to the functioning of the legal 
regime means that almost all of the business performed under the auspices of a convention 
comes before or originates from this plenary body. Indeed, some MEAs explicitly recognise 
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 the hierarchical superiority of the COP, whilst others imply such a hierarchy where subsidiary 





3.1.1. Diplomatic Conferences, Intergovernmental Organisations and COPs 
Historically speaking, COPs as an institutional phenomenon represent the latest development 
in the continuing evolution of international cooperation. Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein 
describe how international conferences were increasingly used in the nineteenth century as a 
solution to the limitations of interaction through diplomatic embassies.
24
 They are 
characterised by their temporary nature. Arnold Tammes evoked this fleeting existence when 
describing them as „a preparatory phase in a law making process; a passing event doomed to 
be buried in archives together with all its rules and its organisational structure and leaving 
behind nothing except the living results‟.25 This, in turn, gave rise to one of the limitations to 
such conferences. This is an efficiency deficit, since another conference (needing new rules 
of procedure and a secretariat) was required whenever a new problem arose.
26
 Other 
limitations centred upon a lack of flexibility in debates, an „invitation only‟ approach to 
participation and the nineteenth and early twentieth century practice of requiring unanimity in 
voting on issues of substance.
27
  
The response was the formation of a range of permanent unions of interested parties. 
They have taken many forms including unions of private individuals and unions of states. 
Much attention has been focused on inter-governmental organisations („IGOs‟) – in particular 
those that are a part of the United Nations system. As part of the post-war rejuvenation of 
inter-state relations, the UN bodies have merited sustained consideration and much research 
has been completed on them.
28
 
Even though IGOs represented a more efficient, permanent and regularised means for 
states to perform functions that they could not individually undertake, interest in expanding 
their number dropped off. It has been claimed that this was in part because, in a context of 
continuing conflicts, there were doubts about the effectiveness of IGOs, and because the 
supranational authority of IGOs was inconsistent with increasing assertions of property 
rights, particularly over environmental resources.
29
 Establishing new IGOs therefore fell out 
of favour. This, however, coincided with the expansion of international environmental treaty 
law. For these MEAs there remained a well-known need for regular meetings which could 
not be met by temporary diplomatic conferences. 
It is appreciated that regular meetings of the contracting parties prevent initiatives 
from stalling or being ignored.
30
 Furthermore, environmental knowledge is continually 
evolving, even after an MEA has been concluded. Best practice can change, and the status of 
species may become more or less endangered. Additionally, treaty negotiations can be 
difficult as states may be wary about the economic and social costs of action, and argue over 
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 who should take on the greatest burden when addressing a threat. Limited political agreement 
may therefore be the only possibility coupled to acceptance that further refinement will take 
place as greater consensus becomes possible.
31
 Thomas Gehring concludes that diplomatic 
conferences for negotiating an MEA simply cannot be expected, under such conditions, to 
produce a „complete contract‟ from the start.32 Environmental problems, therefore, demand 
regimes that are sufficiently malleable to respond to subsequent and rapid developments.
33
  
COPs were therefore designed to provide flexibility and to overcome the failings of 
diplomatic conferences and IGOs.
34
 Consequently, since the 1971 Convention on Wetlands 
of International Importance (hereafter „Ramsar‟)35 was the first to employ a COP,36 they have 
been the favoured approach. 
 
3.1.2. Implications for the Proposed Research 
The emergence of COPs has had some interesting consequences. First, international relations 
scholars have had cause to move their focus away from „international organisations‟ and to 
re-train it upon „international institutions‟; a field defined in broader terms to encompass the 
new forms of international cooperation.
37
 For international environmental law scholars, one 
question has been whether international institutional law applies to COPs.
38
 In the context of 
this project, the significance stems from the fact that there are very few resources on the 
internal modalities for COP preparation and participation, compared to those available on 
diplomatic conferences and IGOs. Is it therefore appropriate to look for ideas and guidance 
from these resources when pursuing research into participation and preparation for COPs? 
This resolves into a familiar question: are COPs international organisations, 
negotiating conferences, or something distinct from both of these? As others have found, a 
definitive answer to this is elusive, not least since, as Nigel White observes, a precise 
definition of an international organisation is impossible.
39
 Indeed there is some divergence on 
the principal features of such IGOs.
40
 Nevertheless, in attempting to determine whether COPs 
are, or are closely related to, IGOs, Henry Schermers and Niels Blokker‟s definition is a 
common starting point. They define international organisations as „forms of cooperation 
founded on an international agreement creating at least one organ with a will of its own, 
established under international law‟.41 Most writers then begin by recognising that COPs bear 
some similarities to this conception of IGOs. Churchill and Ulfstein observe that they are 
self-governing creatures, born of treaties, and that together with their secretariats and 
committees they amount to more than a diplomatic conference.
42
 Nevertheless, the COPs‟ 
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 narrow focus upon specific problems, with less scope to adapt to other purposes, means that 
they were not IGOs in a traditional sense. Thus, Ulfstein later confirmed that COPs „are not 
merely intergovernmental conferences, since they are established by treaties as permanent 
organs… while they also differ from traditional [IGOs].‟43  
If instead a purposive and practical approach is adopted for comparing COPs with 
IGOs and diplomatic conferences, the boundaries between all three seem less clear. Whilst 
each developed from the short-comings described, the dynamics between the parties and the 
need to represent the national interest in a multi-lateral context remained the same. Thus it is 
possible to claim that COPs are in practice like both IGOs and diplomatic conferences. Thus, 
Philippe Sands can regard COPs as „in effect‟ international organisations44 and Churchill and 
Ulfstein that the functions of COPs are similar to IGOs thereby justifying the extension of 
international institutional law.
45
 Equally, Jacob Werksman is correct in observing that „the 
participants and the modus operandi of the states involved in an international negotiating 
conference and a COP [are] outwardly similar,‟ with the same people meeting in the same 
room discussing the same issues.
46
  
Given such similarities in terms of state concerns and motivation for engaging in multi-
lateral discussions, it is felt that the literature on IGOs and diplomatic conferences should be 
considered as informative for research on COPs. That said caution will be necessary where 
rules of procedure differ. 
 
3.2. The Power of COPs 
 
It was noted that COPs were intended to offer monitoring, review and development 
opportunities for environmental regimes. This breaks down into more specific powers, but 
there remains considerable variety as to the extent of the powers awarded to the COPs and the 
tasks with which they may be presented. This variety exists between MEAs and also between 
plenary sessions under the same convention. Broadly speaking, the responsibilities of the 
COP cover (i) systems management, (ii) strategic planning, (iii) reviewing compliance and 
progress, and (iv) obligation development.  
 
3.2.1. Systems Management 
These responsibilities, given that they focus upon maintaining the administrative support and 
operating systems of an MEA, are primarily internal in effect. For example, delegations will 
work together as part of exercising the COPs authority to set budgets, adopt rules of 
procedure, establish ad hoc committees, elect states to executive committees, and appoint a 
body to undertake the role of a Secretariat. 
 
3.2.2. Strategic Planning 
In order to reach the long term objectives set by the majority of MEAs, short and medium 
term programming is necessary. This priority and policy setting is a common responsibility 
for COPs, although as part of this they will often delegate detailed drafting and discussions to 
supporting ad hoc and scientific committees. The extent to which delegations at COPs then 
rework the output from these committees, or simply accept their proposals at face value, is 
unknown and should be an issue requiring investigation in any subsequent research project. 
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3.2.3. Reviewing Compliance and Progress  
The possibility of stagnation is one of the major reasons for the inclusion of regular COPs. 
Thus many are charged with reviewing implementation and progress for their founding 
conventions.
47
 Diversity begins to appear in the powers conferred upon the COP to identify 
and respond to instances of non-compliance with obligations. Techniques for promoting 
compliance range from reporting and capacity building, through verification and inspections, 
to non-compliance adjudications and sanctions.
48
 COPs differ with regard to how far along 
this continuum their roles and powers extend. The majority are engaged in reviewing the 
periodic reports on implementation which contracting parties are often obliged to submit.
49
 In 
contrast just a few are involved on those rare occasions where non-compliance adjudications 




3.2.4. Development of Substantive Obligations 
The involvement of COPs in the development of the substantive obligations for contracting 
parties has been the subject of extensive academic analysis. However, the details of the 
debates surrounding any law making powers of the COP need to be delayed until 
consideration is given later in this paper to the composition of delegations. Here it is simply 
necessary to observe that the plenary body to MEAs can be authorised to develop the 
substantive obligations in certain ways.
51
 A COP can have all or a selection of the following 
powers, namely to: adopt amendments to the original treaty;
52
 adopt protocols and thereby 
add to the substantive obligations of the original agreement;
53
 amend annexes to the treaty;
54
 
adopt interpretations, or rules governing a desired mechanism, pursuant to an explicit request 
in the MEA;
55
 adopt interpretations for the operation of the convention that are not explicitly 
called for in the founding treaty.
56
  
These powers may be exercised occasionally or regularly, and thus in the latter situation 
be a recurring feature on the agenda of a COP. The 1973 Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Fauna („CITES)57 exemplifies this, where the 
appendices are continually amended, thereby altering the reach of the trade controls 
introduced under that agreement. However, there can still be differences between such work. 
For example, and returning to CITES, separate proposals for different species to be include in 
CITES‟ appendices may be more politically or economically sensitive for one species than 
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 another.
58
 The stakes for delegations may therefore vary depending upon the context in which 
the powers to alter substantive obligations are being used.   
 
3.2.5. Further Implications for the Research 
The above gives a deeper appreciation of the diverse demands that are placed upon delegates 
to COPs and the variety of matters that preparation and participation may need to address. 
However, these powers of plenary bodies to MEAs also raise methodological implications for 
the research. What has been revealed is that there is great diversity both within and amongst 
COPs and their work, such that any research into the internal modalities of preparation and 
participation must exercise caution if making comparisons and claiming generality when 
drawing conclusions. The distinctive roles of COPs mean that they can justifiably be 
researched in isolation, however findings do not necessarily apply to a different plenary body 
under another MEA. 
 
 
4. The Internal Modalities for Preparation 
 
In the remaining sections, the internal modalities of COP delegations will be explored as far 
as possible. This will be approached by assessing the external rules that partially constrain the 
autonomy of states to set their own modalities. Thereafter further information will be sought 
in the writings of former delegates and academics, as well as in records maintained under 
MEAs. This reveals interesting insights but also leads to more intriguing questions. 
Furthermore, the Ramsar Convention will be used to illustrate these constraining rules and to 
exemplify the unanswered questions that merit subsequent research. Additional formative 
insights into the previous modalities of the UK delegation to Ramsar are also offered in the 
light of discussions with one long-serving representative.
59
 Whilst there is obviously a need 
to verify the information obtained, these discussions have highlighted the potential such a 
research methodology offers for insights into modalities that are not evident in official 
documentation.  
 
4.1. Preparation in Context and External Constraints 
 
With respect to preparation, this takes place in a context where the primary actors under 
international law (states) are, as Bodansky says, „complex entities, with many constituent 
parts, often with very different interests and beliefs of their own.‟60 These parts can include 
an executive branch of government, legislative and judicial branches, federal governments 
and private actors.
61
 There can be great diversity between the interests of these branches and 
also within each of these parts.
62
 
Implementation of an MEA will be led by a particular ministry and it is this body that 
will set the tone and priorities for participation. This may be a mixed-ministry or one more 
dedicated to environmental protection. Furthermore, the lead ministry may be engaging with 
a COP because of its own national agenda; looking for international sanctioning for a position 
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 it wishes to adopt in national debates.
63
 Alternatively, the delegation may be looking to 
exploit any informal hierarchy of the MEAs to bring forward debates in a „sub-ordinate‟ 
regime.  
It might then be thought that best practice for preparing delegations for COPs would 
be to engage with all of the noted branches as part of defining the national interest on a given 
issue.
64
 Nevertheless, this is difficult given the limited time available to consult groups, and 
the diversity of political, commercial and personal interests which may be irreconcilable. 
What is more, making environmental policies democratically accountable is near impossible 
as national votes cannot be taken on every issue being listed on a COP agenda. Thus 
modalities for selecting key stakeholders are significant since they affect who has an input 
and will feel engaged with the COP process. However, as Bodansky observes, there may be 
no right to vote for these stakeholders so they do not have any real decision making powers 
themselves.
65
 A significant threat to the persuasiveness and legitimacy of a decision therefore 
comes from those excluded. 
There are few external controls on state modalities for consultations as part of 
preparing for COPs. Wide consultation is promoted in Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration which recommends that environmental issues are best handled with the 
participation of all concerned citizens.
66
 Building upon this, the 1998 Aarhus Convention
67
 in 
Article 3(7) requires the 44 contracting parties
68
 to promote transparency and participation in 
international environmental decision-making processes. This provision has been developed in 
the Almaty Guidelines, which observe that „public participation generally contributes to the 
quality of decision-making on environmental matters in international forums by bringing 
different opinions and expertise to the process and increasing transparency and 
accountability‟.69 The guidelines go on to say participation should be as wide as possible, 
highlighting members of the public most directly affected by an environmental issue, public-
interest organisations, and those causing, or contributing to, or able to alleviate, a problem, as 
deserving of particular consideration.
70
  
A final, less direct, external constraint upon the process of preparing for a COP is 
provided by the rules of procedure. These will have a practical effect upon preparation since 
they set timeframes for submission of proposals for any agenda, when the agenda will be 
finalised, and when full documentation will be circulated relating to each issue being 
discussed. For example, the Rules of Procedure for the Ramsar COP provides that the 
provisional agenda and dates for the plenary meeting will be circulated one year in advance.
71
 
The documentation providing detailed information on the proposed agenda is circulated three 
months before the opening of the COP.
72
 This means that there is limited time to consult the 
state departments, public bodies and stakeholders.  
 
4.2. UK Preparation for Ramsar COPs  
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Implementation of Ramsar in the UK is entrusted to the National Ramsar Committee.
73
 This 
body has operated as two separate parts since the late 1990s and is aligned with the UK‟s 
Natura 2000 programme being pursued under EU directives. One part – the Natura 
2000/Ramsar Steering Committee („NRSC‟) – is comprised of representatives from (i) 
government departments such as DEFRA, and the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change, (ii) the devolved administrations, and (iii) public bodies like Natural England and 
the Joint Nature Conservation Committee.
74
 The NRSC is chaired by DEFRA and meets 
annually but otherwise exists in a virtual environment whereby regular communication is 
maintained via email and the internet. This means face-to-face meetings are not necessary to 
ensure integration as Ramsar information can be distributed electronically and views 
canvassed from around the country through a central co-ordinator.  
When the documentation for an upcoming Ramsar COP is released, DEFRA 
generates a position document covering the resolutions, which is circulated to designated 
individuals across government and public bodies. The precise circulation list is not known to 
the author. It might be expected that those who participate in the NRSC will be included, 
although this could be investigated through further interviewing with DEFRA. Of additional 
interest would be the level of seniority of the individuals consulted and how this compares to 
preparation for other MEAs. Whilst input at more senior levels may bring welcome 
ministerial backing for Ramsar implementation, it can also unduly politicise discussions on 
resolutions.
75
 Again, this is conducted electronically, and indicates that states ought not to be 
criticised for failing to hold a face-to-face meeting to debate agenda items if there are other 
more efficient methods available through technology. 
Consultations outside of government include coordination at the EU level, as well as 
communication through the Natura 2000/Ramsar Forum. The latter group comprises 
representatives from the NRSC constituents, plus members invited by the NRSC. No 
information is provided with respect to how an NGO receives an invite, although the Terms 
of Reference suggest the list should be reviewed every year.
76
 Permanent members include 15 
NGOs, such as the Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust, UK Major Ports Group, and the National 
Farmers Union.
77
 The forum is a sounding board for their views, with members entitled to 
add agenda items to meetings. The forum represents a new channel for consultation with 
NGOs. Previously, delegates had arranged to meet during Ramsar COPs with UK NGOs that 
had sent representatives, in order to discuss their respective positions and to resolve any 
disagreements if possible. This tended to be a small number of NGOs – predominantly the 
RSPB and the Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust. The forum marks an expansion in the scope of 
consultation and brings forward in time the opportunity to finalise DEFRA‟s position 
document. 
The end product of the UK preparation stage is a document that could allow for wide 
government, EU and NGO consultation, and establishes the „state‟ position. The document 
can then be carried by all delegates to the COP and, if they are required to engage in 
discussions on any resolution, they have a point of reference for the national stance. 
Establishing the extent to which other nations adopt a similar approach or have found 
alternative ways to establish the national position would be of value. 
                                                          
73
 This and much of the information in this section was identified after discussions with David Stroud; supra 
note 59. 
74
 Natura 2000 and Ramsar Steering Committee Terms of Reference (amended November 2010) available 
<http://archive.defra.gov.uk/rural/protected/internationally-designated-sites/n2kr-sc-tor-1011.pdf>. 
75
 See in a marine pollution context Bodansky, supra note 9, at 113. 
76






5. Composition of Delegations 
 
If a contracting party elects to send a delegation to a COP,
78
 it needs to decide during its 
preparation who will participate as a delegate. This decision, however, will have a sizeable 
impact upon the way the delegation participates at the COP and might initially better be 
thought of as an important part of the modalities of participation. The selection of delegates 
and the size of delegations is the subject of limited external controls.  
 
5.1. External Controls: Full Powers, Credentials and COPs 
 
From the early stages of a COP, an ad hoc committee will review the “credentials” of the 
delegates.
79
 For example, the procedural rules for the plenary meetings held under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity require that any delegation be comprised of a designated 
head and other accredited people.
80
 That accreditation is to be proved through delivery of 
credentials issued by the Head of State or Government or by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.
81
 Similarly, CITES demands that delegations be made up of a representative, 
alternative representatives (who may take the representative‟s place at any time), and 
advisors.
82
 The representative and alternatives must have been granted powers by „a proper 
authority, i.e. the Head of State, the Head of Government or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
enabling him/her to represent the Party at the meeting.‟83 Until such credentials have been 
supplied and approved by the designated committee at the COP, the representative may not 
vote on any proposal.
84
 This restriction on the right to vote is of some importance given the 




Few have considered the level of authority substantiated by the credentials requested 
by COPs. International lawyers will be familiar with the term, albeit in the different context 
of IGOs and diplomatic conferences.
86
 They will also be used to contrasting the idea with that 
of “full powers”. Credentials support less extensive authority compared to full powers. In the 
context of diplomatic conferences, credentials are understood as granting authority to the 
bearer to engage in three activities: negotiating a treaty, voting to adopt the final version of 
the text and signing a final act.
87
 These stages, whilst important in the process of creating a 
treaty, do not result in a binding agreement. This is because a state must first express its 
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 consent to be bound.  Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties („VCLT‟)88 this 
consent to be bound can only be expressed by way of „signature, exchange of instruments 
constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if 
so agreed‟.  
In comparison, „full powers‟ are:  
 
A document emanating from the competent authority of a State designating a 
person to represent the State for negotiating, adopting or authenticating the text of 
a treaty, for expressing the consent of the state to be bound by a treaty, or for 




The issuing of „full powers‟ therefore covers some of the activities authorised in credentials 
(negotiation and adoption), but also empowers the holder to do more. Some of these acts can 
give rise to obligations for the state. For instance, if the treaty calls for a state to signal its 
consent to be bound by way of signature, then the signatory must carry full powers. Consent 
by way of signature, however, is rare
90
 with many treaties preferring consent by ratification 
or accession.
91
 Nevertheless, the final stages of negotiating such a treaty may well include a 
ceremonial signing of the adopted treaty text which serves to authenticate the version in 
question. Authenticating the text of the treaty may not amount to consent to be bound, but a 
signatory state must refrain thereafter from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of 
the treaty.
92
 Again, this obligation can only arise where the signatory holds full powers 
allowing them to authenticate a text.  
Full powers might, therefore, be viewed as a key document where treaties rely upon 
acts of delegates to signal consent to be bound by new obligations. Furthermore, the VCLT 
does allow an unlimited range of other methods to be agreed between states, generating the 
potential for consent to be bound to take a new form which relies upon the act of an 
individual at a COP.  
The question that arises in the light of these established rules is whether the 
credentials being requested for COPs are the same limited form as those for diplomatic 
conferences, or whether they need to perform the wider functions of full powers. Logically, 
the answer will involve the COP‟s powers to develop obligations and depend upon whether 
new obligations are being introduced to which delegates are expected to provide consent to 
be bound. 
In section 3.2.4, the variety of powers for developing the obligations of the 
contracting parties were listed. Each will be taken in turn, beginning with amending treaties 
and adopting protocols. Here it is possible to see that a delegate attending a COP, whose 
work includes adopting amendments to the original treaty or a protocol, requires credentials 
in the limited sense. Consent to be bound will usually be expected subsequently by way of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
93
 Of course, if there is to be authentication of 
the protocol or amended text at the plenary, then full powers will be needed. 
Moving on, powers to amend annexes or appendices can be found in wildlife treaties 
such as CITES and pollution conventions such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer.
94
 Adding species to appendices in order to extend protection over 
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 their populations, or altering emissions targets for particular substances, may deliver 
desirable flexibility in an uncertain or dynamic field of regulation. It may also appear less 
controversial and simply a matter of technical detail which does not add to the parties 
commitments under the convention.
95
 However, this is not necessarily true in all cases and 
changes can significantly add to the extent of the parties obligations and be politically 
controversial.
96
 With only a few exceptions, these amendments to MEAs eventually become 




Locating states‟ tacit consent to be bound in such “opting-out” situations is said to fall 
within the bounds of „any other agreed means‟ under the VCLT.98 What seems less 
immediately apparent is whether such consent by silence or implication is to be attributed to 
the acts of the delegates attending a COP. This seems unlikely given the practice of delaying 
entry into force of amendments until a time after the end of a COP, during which period a 
larger group of individuals might be regarded as having remained silent.
99
 It therefore appears 
that developing obligations in this manner does not usually require full powers for the 
delegates and that credentials in the limited sense would be sufficient. 
The Montreal Protocol is an anomaly with regards to some amendments to its 
appendices since it does not allow for opting out of certain adjustments and reductions in the 
permitted levels of consumption and production of controlled substances. 
100
 Such 
amendments may be made by consensus and, failing that, by a two-thirds majority binding on 
all, including those that voted against.
101
 Identifying consent to be bound in these 
circumstances is difficult. Where they may be made by majority vote, it seems consent to be 
bound may be absent, leading to doubts about the legal force of such adjustments. 
Alternatively, it has been argued a form of advance consent (by one of the regular means) 
was provided at the time of consenting to the protocol, which was possible because the 
parties were aware of the adjustments that would be needed at that time.
102
 These alternatives, 
however, do not seem to suggest that full powers would be required by the delegates to these 
meetings. 
The final form of power concerns interpretation of terms. In some instances these may 
be expressly authorised in the text of the treaty.
103
 Churchill and Ulfstein believe the intention 
was therefore to create binding interpretations,
104
 but locating consent to be bound is again 
problematic. A form of general consent, similar to that described for the Montreal Protocol, 
has been suggested.
105
 However, it is difficult to see that the parties had the same level of 
awareness of the likely form these future decisions would take. And such de-limiting of 
general consent, so as to be available where parties do not know the detail of future decisions, 
would seem to remove the need for „tacit consent‟ to explain binding amendments to 
appendices. Ultimately, if this is the basis for making these interpretations binding, then 
delegates still do not require full powers. The alternative is to question the independent 
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 binding force of these interpretations,
106
 and to either argue that they are agreed 
interpretations (see below) or soft-law with which states are prepared to comply. Again, this 
would also imply that delegates would need no more than traditional credentials for 
negotiations.  
On other occasions, COPs have issued official interpretations without express 
authorisation from the treaty. Churchill and Ulfstein doubt that such decisions are binding, 
but instead suggest that they are at best authoritative.
107
 Nevertheless, as Alan Boyle 
recognises, such decisions may constitute an agreed interpretation of the treaty which carries 
significance under Article 31(3)(a), VCLT.
108
 As a result, these decisions might not add 
anything new to the original treaty obligations – they merely clarify what was originally 
intended.
109
 Again the position is reached that the authority required need only be traditional 
credentials. 
On balance, this analysis suggests that despite the range of powers available to develop or 
add to the obligations of contracting parties, the credentials committees of COPs need not 
demand „full powers‟ for delegates. Thus, the individuals chosen to represent states need only 
produce evidence of authority to negotiate and adopt decisions since they are not called upon 
to express consent to be bound. 
 
5.2. External Controls: MEA Provisions 
 
Beyond the demands imposed for credentials, rarely is anything else stipulated about the 
identity of delegates. There is, however, a notable exception. A few international institutions 
require or request that states appoint delegates with particular qualifications. For example, in 
the context of IGOs, the World Meteorological Organization stipulates that delegations to its 
congress must designate a head who should be the director of its meteorological or 
hydrometeorological service.
110
 Further, the constitution to the International Labour 
Organisation expects delegations to be made up of four members, two of whom are to 
represent the government whilst the remaining two are to represent respectively the 
employers and the workers.
111
 
MEAs very rarely seek to direct the qualifications of delegates. The Ramsar 
Convention is virtually unique in providing that: 
 
The representatives of the Contracting Parties at such Conferences should include 
persons who are experts on wetlands or waterfowl by reason of knowledge and 




The World Heritage Convention includes a similar demand, albeit in the context of the World 
Heritage Committee which performs the same functions as a COP, but is not a plenary body. 
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 Thus the representatives of those states elected to a seat on the executive committee are to be 
„persons qualified in the field of the cultural or natural heritage.‟113  
These two articles, which seek to dictate the characteristics of delegates, are not found 
in other MEAs. They raise interesting points. The first is that the external control sought is 
rather weak given the drafting deployed. In the case of Ramsar, the article merely establishes 
that parties „should‟ send someone with suitable qualifications. Further, the expertise is not 
limited to a scientific qualification, but can be derived from administrative experience or any 
other appropriate capabilities chosen by the contracting party. What is more the degree of 
knowledge and experience is left open-ended. This indeterminacy in the expertise actually 
required is echoed in the World Heritage Convention provision given that the forms of 
qualification for representatives are also left undefined. 
It would be interesting to discover whether the credentials committee for Ramsar and 
the Secretariat to the World Heritage Convention pay much heed to these provisions. 
Certainly the publically available reports of the credentials committee to Ramsar do not 
contain sufficient detail to be able to answer this. Furthermore, the Rules of Procedure for the 
World Heritage Committee might require that state members forward names and 
qualifications of their representatives to the Secretariat, but they are silent as to what is and 
can be done with those details.
114
 From an alternative perspective, the question could be 
asked whether the contracting parties consciously look to meet this requirement when putting 
together a delegation. This too is difficult to answer. A sense cannot be gained from the lists 
of those who attend the COP to Ramsar and the World Heritage Committee, since they do not 
reliably or clearly indicate expertise. 
The thinking behind these provisions is also unclear. Schermers has noted a number of 
perceived advantages of scientific experts as delegates over those from governments in the 
context of non-plenary organs.
115
 Of note is the presumed advantage that the interests of the 
IGO will be more of a focus for participants than those tied to a political agenda, although 
there may be less access to government branches for such individuals creating 
implementation problems in the long-term.
116
 In reality, MEAs sometimes require expert 
input and at other times political. It may be that in the case of Ramsar and the World Heritage 
Convention the need for regular technical scientific input at plenary meetings was known 
from the start,
117
 whilst other conventions needed predominantly political judgments to be 
made on the scientific evidence that was being produced.
118
 Equally plausible, but rather 
more troubling, would be if, given the other MEAs were predominantly negotiated under the 
auspices of UNEP, a common precedent was used as a foundation for negotiations, which led 




5.3. Leads from Practice 
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 Particularly for Ramsar which did not have a dedicated scientific committee until 1993, when the Scientific 
and Technical Review Panel was established at COP5; Resolution 5.5. 
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 As has been observed, there are limited external controls upon the identity of delegates, and 
the internal modalities of states can operate relatively unfettered. As to evidence of the 
modalities states have adopted, few printed resources are available. The most obvious are the 
lists of participants to each COP, but these can only generate possible lines of enquiry since 
they do not give a sufficiently reliable or detailed account of an individual and their skills. 
Furthermore, such lists are not always kept or made readily available to the public.
120
 Where 
there are consecutive or complete runs for all COPs, leads on the internal modalities present 
themselves.  
The Ramsar Convention provides a good example of this potential. There have been ten 
COPs since Ramsar entered into force.
121
 The lists of participants have been analysed and 
data produced on two bases. The first considers the size of the delegations that states prefer to 
send to meetings. The second traces individual delegates through COPs so as to gain an 
impression of the level of experience that is present in delegations. 
 
5.3.1. Delegation Sizes 
When considering delegation sizes it is first necessary to separate out those countries that 
host the COP. This is because hosting generates huge anomalies in the size of delegations, as 
revealed in Table 1.
122
 There is then a second group of states for whom care must be 
exercised when including their numbers. These are states that, at the time of the COP, hold 
the Presidency of the Council to the European Union. Despite the European Union being a 
non-party to the Ramsar Convention, since the inclusion of a common foreign and security 
policy chapter in the Treaty on European Union, member states have promised to coordinate 
their actions in international organisations and conferences so as to uphold the Union‟s 
position.
123
 Whilst a common position is not demanded in such situations, softer coordination 
still requires additional capacity in terms of delegates so that if a common position does exist, 
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Australia 0 4 2 4 3 20 7 7 7 8 
Canada   2 29 4 3 5 7 12 6 4 
Costa Rica         2 4 13 4 1 2 
Italy 19 1 1 4 1 2 5 4 6 3 
Japan 2 2 2 6 52 7 10 8 10 8 
Netherlands 6 14 3 6 5 6 10 6 7 6 
Rep. of Korea             10 10 21 35 
Spain   2 2 2 2 1 8 43 7 5 
Switzerland 1 2 1 8 1 3 2 5 3 2 
Uganda       3 2 4 4 7 11 13 
 
 
What the remaining figures reveal is that the average size for delegations has increased from 
two to three over the 10 Ramsar COPs. In addition, some states, which have been contracting 
parties for a significant period of time, have failed to attend any COPs, these being Bahrain 
and Luxembourg. Nevertheless, attendance remains very good; averaging 90% of contracting 
parties. More interestingly, although perhaps not as surprising given their greater available 
resources, developed and advanced developing state parties have most often sent a delegation 
which exceeds the average size for a given COP; 34% and 60% of the time respectively. In 
contrast, developing and least developed state parties have only exceeded the average on 13% 
and 9% of the occasions a delegation was sent. More generally, and as illustrated in Table 2, 
the latter two sets of states are most likely to send between two and three delegates, but are 
no more likely to fail to attend than developed states. This may be because of the availability 
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 Highlighted cells indicate the year in which that state was the host. Empty cells indicate that the state was 
not, at the time, a contracting party with full participatory rights. A value of zero indicates the state was a 
contracting party and so could have sent a delegation. All figures taken from the lists of participants available 
through <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-cops/main/ramsar/1-31-58_4000_0__>. 
  





Further observations based on the attendance records for delegation sizes indicate two 
phenomena. The first is that some states habitually send what will be described as super 
delegations. These are delegations comprising 10 or more delegates. France, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, the United States of America, China, and Malaysia have regularly 
adopted this modality whilst isolated instances for recent COPs can be observed for South 
Africa, Thailand, Uganda and Tanzania. Second, a number of states consistently send larger 
than average delegations. For example, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark from 
1980-2002, Brazil, South Africa, Thailand, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.  
These records and the statistics that can be generated from them demonstrate some of the 
information that can be gleaned from the Ramsar list of participants, and the patterns that can 
be revealed. If the lists available under other MEAs are investigated, average delegation sizes 
can be tentatively compared. Early research into the Convention on Climate Change 
(„UNFCCC‟),127 CBD and CITES indicate that far more resources and senior politicians are 
committed to these COPs. For example, the average delegation size at the most recent COPs 
are 31 (UNFCCC), 10 (CBD) and 5.5 (CITES), whilst the involvement of ministers is – as 
might be anticipated – close to 60% of delegations for the UNFCCC. However in these 
instances, such data is intriguing as to the possible thinking behind, and consequences of, 
these modalities. These can only be explored fully through interviewing those responsible for 
setting them. 
 
5.3.2. Delegate Experience  
The Ramsar lists of participants also reveal information about the level of experience present 
in delegations. Thus, where a state party had the possibility of sending someone who had 
previously attended a COP, a note can be made of those occasions when they did and when 
they didn‟t. The first item to note from this is that experience is often present. Of those 
contracting parties in a position to include a delegate with experience at COPs 2-10, on 
average 62% did so. Thereafter the states fall into a number of groups. The first is those states 
that regularly send a super delegation and which include a number of delegates with previous 
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 experience. The best examples of this practice are China and the USA. At COP10, China sent 
17 delegates, of whom seven had attended a Ramsar COP in the past. Likewise, at COP9 the 
USA sent 10 delegates, five of whom had previous experience of a Ramsar COP.  
Thereafter states fall into groups combining (i) experience with larger than average 
delegations,
128
 (ii) those that might send an average or below average sized delegation, but 
they have almost always included one individual who has previous experience,
129
 (iii) those 
that have never sent an experienced delegate but do send large delegations,
130
 and (iv) those 
that regularly send average sized (or smaller) inexperienced delegations.
131
    
The records also reveal that some individuals have provided long service for their 
states. For example, Uganda has attended every COP since becoming a contracting party in 
1990, and Paul Mafabi has always been one of its delegates. Other long-serving delegates 
include Veit Koester (1980-2002) and Paul Jepsen (1987-2002) for Denmark, Makoto 
Komoda (since 1990) for Japan, and Dr Zygmunt Krzeminski (1980-1999) and Dr Kazimierz 
Dobrowolski (1980-83 and 1990-99) for Poland. The effect of such individuals upon 
negotiations and developments under COPs remains unclear.
132
  
The modalities described above concern intra-COP patterns, but an added dimension, 
which ought to be considered in the future, is that of inter-COP experience. The atomised 
nature of MEA administration threatens the ability of regimes to complement each other. 
Delegate experience from other plenary bodies may therefore be an additional factor in the 
internal modalities of delegations.    
 
5.4. Further Research Questions 
 
As noted, the records that are available on delegation composition are predominantly 
intriguing rather than conclusive. With respect to the size of delegations and the capabilities 
of delegates, the data merely notes fluctuations without establishing the reasoning behind 
these modalities and their consequences. In this respect, accounts of UNGA could provide 
good theories of the likely tactics being employed and consequences. For example, if 
delegation size is taken as a starting point, Robert Keohane observes that many states 
(particularly small states) cannot afford to send large enough delegations to keep up with all 
of the work of UNGA.
133
 This, he suggested, gave larger and better informed states and 
regional groupings more influence over the smaller delegations.
134
 More recently, Schermers 
and Blokker state that whilst many international organisations are principally interested in a 
member being present, there are advantages and disadvantages to having a small 
delegation.
135
 Small delegations are more flexible and can easily maintain coherence in the 
positions adopted, whilst large delegations are likely to contain greater experience and be 
able to engage in more negotiations or meetings, particularly where there are sub-groups 
meeting simultaneously.
136
 Despite running for a short period, COPs to environmental 
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 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 34, at 187. 
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 treaties have much work to complete in a tight timeframe, and parallel working is therefore 
also common.  
In terms of case studies, the author‟s initial investigations suggest that the UK‟s 
approach in the past appeared to be to send sufficient delegates to be able to take part in 
contact groups for resolutions that required greater implementation by the UK.
137
 This was 
because the UK recognised the need to implement these resolutions with fidelity and 
therefore it was necessary to ensure that that which was agreed was practicable.
138
 Faith is 
also placed in the briefing document prepared by DEFRA to ensure that the delegation would 
act consistently, and not least because, by the time the COP opened, any reworking of draft 
resolutions would likely be minor.
139
 
With respect to the capability of delegates, Conor Cruise O‟Brien, reflecting upon his 
personal experiences of UNGA, sought to remind others that:  
 
The United Nations is made up of people... and their differences do affect the 
proceedings and the decisions. It can be argued that delegates, being there to 
represent their country, not themselves, ought not to have personal outlooks, or at 




Similarly John Hadwin and Johan Kaufmann felt that the political importance and experience 
of delegates was significant since UNGA debates and decisions were affected by the 
personality of delegates.
141
 Furthermore, lack of experience would inhibit interventions.
142
 
This experience can relate to the plenary itself, or amount to subject expertise. With respect 
to the former, it is difficult to know how many meetings it takes until an individual derives 
benefit from experience when negotiating.
143
 But thereafter, a number of other questions 
arise. Are there any individuals, for instance those who have served for long periods as 
delegates, who have been able to influence negotiations to a greater extent? Do some find 
themselves being more frequently invited to lead work on sub-committees and, if so, why? 
What impact does the retirement of long serving delegates have upon the implementation of 
the MEA in their states and upon future internal modalities? For example, ever since 
Krzeminski and Dobrowolski stopped acting as delegates in 1999, Poland has failed to send 
any delegates with prior experience of Ramsar COPs. Finally, whilst Hadwin and Kaufmann 
recall the saying that in selecting delegates it was better to have „continuous clods than 
occasional geniuses‟, they also warned against the long-serving delegate who has had time to 
build an empire without much regard for co-ordination with the government position.
144
 
Subject experience may also prove important for shaping negotiations. Some states will 
ensure that suitable specialists are available if resolutions so demand. For example, at COP10 
of Ramsar, Resolution X.25 was adopted on Wetlands and Biofuels. This was a resolution of 
importance to the UK, and a specialist in the field (with additional experience of similar 
discussion conducted under the CBD) was chosen as a delegate for the UK in order to cover 
the contact group working on this resolution.
145
 Nevertheless, not all states have this option 
and the concern is that individuals cannot be expected to be experts in all of the subjects 
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 being discussed.
146
 It is suspected that this is a particular difficulty for smaller delegations 
without large panels of experts in their country of origin who can be despatched to COPs or 
contacted. This may be especially so in COPs to MEAs with extremely wide mandates. For 
example, the CBD is intended to deal with diversity between species, ecosystems and genes, 
whilst Ramsar itself covers inland and marine wetlands. The question that follows from this 
is whether such inexperienced delegations find themselves sidelined from debates or quick to 
accept the word of other delegations or the advice issued by Scientific Committees to a 
COP.
147
    
 
 
6. The Internal Modalities for Participation 
 
The mechanics of participating in COPs are largely defined by the treaty and, in particular, its 
rules of procedures. The rules on voting procedures will have a particular influence upon the 
way states negotiate. In contrast to UNGA, where decisions are made on a simple or two-
thirds majority vote,
148
 MEAs predominantly favour decisions made on the basis of 
consensus, although voting arrangements are often put in place as a fall back. Consensus 
decision making is considered as the absence of any objection from a state to the decision 
proposed.
149
 For example, Ramsar provides for resolutions, recommendations and decisions 
to be adopted by a simple majority of those present and voting, although the Rules of 
Procedure say that this must be a last resort after every effort has been made to reach 
consensus.
150
 Voting is very rare under Ramsar, but not so for CITES where additions to and 
amendments of the appendices are regularly made following a vote.
151
 
Where forms of majority voting are employed – and the best documented is UNGA – 
delegations might need to identify those states that will support the desired outcome, those 
that will not, and those who are undecided but may be open to persuasion to either vote in 
favour or at least abstain.
152
 Influential states may also be contacted in order to see whether 
their support can encourage others to vote accordingly, whilst the vote of small nations might 
be given a lower priority.
153
  
In theory, consensus decision-making should preserve the right of parties to object 
whilst also ensuring that a positive vote is not necessary.
154
 In practice this raises a number of 
interesting questions. First, does this lead to ambitious states holding out for significant 
concessions in order to buy their support or at least silence?
155
 Second, to what extent does 
consensus decision making ensure that more states participate in decision making? With non-
plenary contact groups and discussions in meeting rooms being of significance for 
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 negotiations, how do delegations operate to ensure they have access to the discussions of a 
contact group?
156
 Is language a barrier to such participation for some states? In theory an 
uninvolved state may raise an objection in plenary following the outcomes of those contact 
group negotiations, resulting in the decision either being defeated or delayed until that state 
has been consulted. However, do states consider this a last resort due to embarrassment? 
Alternatively, such objections may be limited by the rules of procedure, as is the case under 
CITES which restricts the reopening of a recommendation in plenary if it has been debated in 
the sub-committees with the availability of full translation.
157
 Thus consensus decision 
making may still require a modality of proactive engagement with negotiations by states 
before any formal adoption. This in turn requires sufficient numbers of delegates as well as 
experience in how to engage with contact groups.  
Beyond this, the external controls on modalities become softer. They may simply try 
to steer groups towards particular forms of negotiation. For example, in 1994 at the Fort 
Lauderdale COP, CITES introduced new guidelines for inscribing species in its 
appendices.
158
 These were notable for attempting to ensure that listing decisions were based 
upon objective or scientific criteria.
159
 Thus, the guidelines seek to make particular forms of 
argumentation the legitimate basis for negotiations, rather than unrestrained bargaining.
160
 
Otherwise, states are free to develop their own modalities for participation in COPs. 
Once again, the few available accounts on participation (mainly in UNGA) may provide 
insights into the likely modalities that would be encountered for COPs. For instance, most 
UNGA delegates act on instructions from their home government, although there remain 
exceptions.
161
 As Schermers observes, the more junior the delegate, the more detailed the 
instructions are likely to be.
162
 Hadwin and Kaufmann felt that ideally instructions would be 
the result of careful consideration by relevant departments before the meeting, duly approved 
at the highest political level, and specific as to objectives and the activity required but with 
some freedom if matters took an unexpected turn.
163
 Certainly the UK‟s preparations 
described earlier come close to good practice by this measure. Of course, strategic pauses can 
be taken in proceedings if the chair of a session feels it is beneficial to give delegates a 
chance to communicate with their home departments.
164
  
A final area of interest concerns the general strategy adopted by the delegation for 
looking to influence proceedings. Here there exist theories concerning different forms of 
leadership,
165
 and more recognition that, in epistemic communities, the claim to knowledge is 
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 a source of influence.
166
 What is more, those communities, if they are involved in a number 
of MEAs, may be able to take co-ordinated action in multiple plenary bodies in order to drive 
through a particular policy. This was recently exemplified in relation to the bird flu outbreak, 
which had generated misguided proposals from the public and politicians that threatened 







The unobtrusive measures that have been deployed in this paper to investigate the internal 
modalities of delegate preparation for, and participation in, COPs have advanced 
understandings on the middle- and background to decisions. External rules generated by 
treaties and rules of procedure are relatively easy to identify. They concern the timing of 
document circulation, consultation with a variety of stakeholders, the credentials of delegates, 
delegate capabilities and the running of proceedings. Nevertheless, they leave a weak 
impression upon the autonomy of states to define their own modalities. These customs, rules 
and ethics are harder to uncover using library based research. Statistical analysis of 
delegations generates intriguing patterns and leads, but with reports of proceedings 
containing so little detail on who said what and when, library sourced records have limited 
usefulness. Finally, there are few accounts on preparation and participation, and those that 
exist predominantly relate to IGOs and are over 50 years old. Nevertheless, it was argued that 
they could still be useful in the context of COPs, and they did prove illuminating. Such 
sources gave support to, and generated suspicions, concerning the way delegations operate.  
Ultimately, however, the analysis has left far more questions unanswered than 
resolved. Key areas identified include: establishing the ways different states prepare their 
positions on draft resolutions (who leads preparation, is chosen for consultation, and why), 
the extent credentials committees and states enforce capability requirements for delegates, the 
rationale behind the differing delegation sizes and levels of expertise plus any observed 
consequences during COPs, the impact of individuals upon proceedings and national 
implementation, the extent to which the advice of sub-committees is questioned, and the 
practical working of consensus decision making. 
The paper has therefore illuminated the field but also revealed the limits of library 
research. Nevertheless, significant foundations have been provided for further research 
employing alternative methodologies, such as interviewing delegates. Here, one test 
interview revealed far more about the modalities of UK preparation and participation in the 
context of Ramsar than was apparent from the internet sources. Not only did the interview 
suggest the UK‟s modalities are considered and sophisticated, but it gave encouragement for 
further interviews. What is more, many of the insights were gained independently from the 
questions the interviewer had in mind. This lends weight towards favouring unstructured 
„elite‟ interviews,168 rather than fully structured (possibly questionnaire based)169 qualitative 
research. The difficulty, however, lies in selecting and securing further interviews. In this 
regard the paper has highlighted the diversity between MEAs, suggesting that, as long as 
                                                          
166
 Corell, supra note 156, at 199. 
167
 See R. Cromie and others, “Responding to emerging challenges: Multilateral environmental agreements and 
highly pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1”, 14(3-4) Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy (2011) pp. 
206-242. 
168
 For a good guide to elite interviewing techniques see L.A. Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (2006). 
169
 On the use of questionnaires with delegates to international organisations see H.K. Jacobson, “Deriving Data 
from Delegates to International Assemblies”, 21(3) International Organization (1967) pp. 592-613. 
 conclusions are predominantly confined to the regime under consideration, conventions can 
and should be studied in isolation. 
From the outset it has been argued that researching delegate preparation and 
participation will, amongst other things, inform judgments on the legitimacy of the decisions 
reached and consequently the likelihood that they will prove persuasive . Furthermore, 
conducting more research in this field will give a more realistic appreciation of the 
contribution of COPs to international environmental law, and open up new spaces for 
challenge or recognition as best practice. 
 
